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Abstract:  In this paper, we focus on the strategic role of corporate venture financing by a corporation in 
securing own demand. When the headquarter finances the venture through the corporate venture 
capitalist, he commits himself to compensate the venture for the effort to increase the complementarity 
between its product and the headquarter's product. The headquarter therefore faces the following trade-
off: either be more aggressive ex post in the product market (by undercutting more its rivals) or use 
corporate venture financing to affect the venture's product innovation outcome to weaken ex post 
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Entrepreneurs often seek venture capitalists to ¯nance their start-up ¯rms.
Most of them often sign an initial ¯nancing contract with an independent
venture capitalist (IVC), i.e. a venture capitalist which has no a±liation
with an established corporate group. At the intermediate stage, a corporate
venture capitalist (CVC), i.e. a venture capitalist with the backing of a
corporate group (hereafter in the paper, we will call it the headquarter (HQ))
might express its interests to participate in the venture.
The evidence showing that large corporations indeed often establish cor-
porate venture funds is quite abundant. For instance, Gompers and Lerner
(1998) show that during the late 1960s and early 1970s, more than 25% of
the Fortune 500 ¯rms established corporate venture funds. It is estimated
that corporate investors accounted for 30% of the commitments to new funds
in 1997. In Europe (EVCA (2001)), about 11% of the funds raised in 2000
came from corporate investors.
There are several reasons underlying the use of corporate venture ¯nanc-
ing (see Gompers and Lerner (1998)). One reason is that it enhances °ex-
ibility for the HQ, because it allows the HQ to focus on the core business
rather thanon other secondary issues (it allows tooutsource R&D activities).
It also allows the HQ to respond more rapidly to investment opportunities.
The use of such a ¯nancing scheme may also enhance trust from the venture,
because it signals that the HQ will not steal the novel idea ofthe venture. Fi-
nally, there is also a strategic reason behind it. Corporate venture ¯nancing
can be used as a strategic vehicle to generate its own demand. Sometimes
2at a later stage the HQ may even incorporate the venture into its business
portfolio. In this paper, we focus our analysis on this last motive.
There are some real examples of this kind of motive. For instance, Oracle
Corporation, a leading IT company, invested in Red Hat Inc. (a company
providing Linux operating system) in order to seize the opportunity to sell
version of its programs to run on Linux (The European Wall Street Journal,
2000). Another example is Intel Corporation which nurtures new start-ups,
that Intel Corporation hopes will grow and become customers for their micro-
processors (The European Wall Street Journal, 2000). Still another example
is Cisco Systems, a leading IT company, which constantly ¯nances start-ups
(The Economist, 2000).
The decision to use corporate venture ¯nancing allows the HQ to in°u-
ence the degree of complementarity between its own product (used by the
venture as an input) and the ¯nal product of the venture. This allows the
HQ to \steal" (or to \secure") demand from other companies when the HQ's
product can be substituted with other inputs. An example could be the
choice between a specialized and a standardized processor as a necessary in-
put for an electronic ¯nal good (produced by the innovative venture). The
present paper builds upon this kind of reasoning and provides aformal model
to explain it.
To get a clearer idea about this present paper, let us consider the case
of a new venture which requires a processor as an input to produce an elec-
tronic ¯nal good. The venture has a choice of either using a specialized or a
standardized processor. Even if the price of a specialized processor is higher
than the price of a standardized one, utilizing the former may enable the
3venture to produce the ¯nal good at lower marginal costs than using the lat-
ter one. We assume that in order to enable this reduction in marginal costs,
the venture has to adapt his product to the HQ's one. We can think of it
as e®ort that the venture has to exert in order to realize the complementary
bene¯ts from using the specialized processor. Thus, this creates a trade-o®
as to which type of processor to be utilized. If the total costs of obtaining
the specialized processor and exerting e®ort are lower than the bene¯ts ac-
crued in term of reduction in marginal costs, then the venture will utilize the
specialized processor.
Suppose that the specialized processor is produced by the HQ, which is
an upstream monopolist, and that the standardized processor is produced
by many ¯rms in a competitive upstream market. Thus, the standardized
processor will be sold at marginal costs. Depending on the relative mag-
nitude of the upstram marginal costs and the downstream marginal costs
of using a certain kind of input, the HQ may or may not be able to do a
price-undercutting strategy in order to attract demand for the specialized
processor. The corporate venture ¯nancing enhances the °exibility of the
price-undercutting strategy. Consequently, the HQ will not have to undercut
the competitors' price so much. At the extreme case, in which the HQ is not
able to do a price-undercutting strategy, i.e. because its marginal costs of
producing the specialized input are prohibitively high, the corporate venture
¯nancing enables the HQ toin°uence the degree of complementarity between
its own product and the venture's one in its own favor and in this way to
\steal" demand from the competitors. Thus, it secures demand for the HQ.
In this paper, we also show that in the absence of corporate venture ¯-
4nancing there can be a hold-up problem. The venture will be reluctant to
exert e®ort in order to realize the complementary bene¯ts. This is because
the venture anticipates that the HQ will expropriate these bene¯ts, i.e. by
taking them into account in the determination of the specialized processor
price. This, of course, reduces the °exibility of the price-undercutting strat-
egy. To resolve this hold-up problem, the HQ can provide ¯nancing to the
venture through its intermediary, i.e. the corporate venture fund. Once a ¯-
nancing is provided, the corporate venture capitalist can impose the optimal
degree of complementarity that has to be carried out by the venture and the
compensation of the entrepreneur can be set in the agreement.
There are some related papers investigating the role of corporate venture
¯nancing, however they emphasize di®erent aspects of corporate venture ¯-
nancing from what we are focusing here, i.e. on the securing-demand motive.
Bharat and Galetovic (2000) analyses the choice of ¯nancing of a new ven-
ture. It could be ¯nancedby a venture capitalist or by a corporation directly.
Their focus is on the link between the strength of property rights and the
choice of ¯nancing. They show that whenproperty rights are strong, the ven-
ture is funded by the venture capitalist, however when property rights are
weak, the venture may be ¯nanced by the corporation, or the venture capi-
talist, or remains unfunded. Similar issues have been raised by Aghion and
Tirole (1994) and Ambec and Poitevin (1999) for the HQ's decision whether
or not to do R&D in-house or outside the organization.
Similar to our paper, Hellmann (2001) analyzes the strategic role of ven-
ture investing. However, his focus is di®erent from ours. He focuses on the
venture's choice of ¯nancing, i.e. either a corporate venture ¯nancing or an
5independent venture ¯nancing. Thus, in his paper, the entrepreneur is an
active player deciding which venture capitalist to sign a contract with. It
therefore provides a rationale for the use of corporate venture ¯nancing in
early stages. The use of corporate venture capital mitigates the potential
hold-up problem at the R&D stage. In contrast, our paper takes another
perspective. First, it provides a rationale for later-stage ¯nancing. And sec-
ond, it focuses on the HQ's active roleinutilizing corporate venture ¯nancing
strategically as a commitment to compensate the entrepreneur for potential
opportunistic bahavior in the product market. It therefore helps to avoid a
potential ex post hold-up problem in the product market (and not a hold-up
problem in the R&D stage). We argue that centering the focus on the HQ
enables us to pin point the strategic role of corporate venture ¯nancing in
securing demand for the HQ and show that this depends on the existence of
substitute inputs for the venture.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
benchmark model, i.e. the model with no corporate venture ¯nancing. Sec-
tion 3 covers the model with corporate venture ¯nancing. In this Section,
we also draw some testable empirical implications. Section 4 discusses the
case of securing demand in more detail. Section 5 wrap up the results. A
general discussion on how such corporate venture ¯nancing is implemented
in practice (with additional examples) is done in Section 6. Section 7 covers
some interesting extensions. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
62 The Benchmark Model (No Corporate Ven-
ture Financing)
We consider a case in which there is an entrepreneur (managing a venture)
that after having innovated, manufactures a ¯nal good and sell it in a new
market. Thus, upon success the venture will be a monopolist. Without loss
of generality, we normalize the venture's exerted e®ort in innovation to zero.
The wealthless entrepreneur gets the initial (¯rst-round) ¯nancing from an
independent venture capitalist (IVC). We assume that the IVC faces com-
petition from other venture capitalists and is therefore put at its reservation
value. Having a ¯nancing from the IVC implies that the venture has full
°exibility on the action that the venture takes. The amount of investment
needed is denoted by I > 0.
The life span of the venture can be divided into two phases, in which the
¯rst phase is the R&D phase. The R&D phase consists of two stages, i.e. the
contracting stage and the R&D stage. The second phase is the production
phase.1 For the sake of realism, we assume that the IVC (later also the CVC)
will exit after the start-up phase.2 3
1The R&D phase is often called the seed phase. It includes the development of a business
plan, prototypes, research and development, and a contractual arrangement. While the
production phase is commonly called the start-up phase, in which production and initial
marketing are carried out. (see Tykov¶ a, 2000).
2A study done by Black and Gilson (1998) provides evidence that it is indeed the case.
After the exit, the entrepreneur very often controls the ¯rm, and some other minority
shareholders are passive. Furthermore, we assume that vertical merger between the HQ
and the venture prior to the production phase is not possible because of an antitrust
reason. We will relax this assumption in the extension.
3The usefulness of IVC can be argued in the following way: the HQ might not want
to ¯nance the venture since the beginning (but rather acquire it in a later stage from
the IVC) if there is a (even small) probability that the project might not be su±ciently
7Inthemanufacturing process(at theproductionphase), the ventureneeds
to use an input. There are 2 substitutable inputs available in the market,
i.e. input A and input B (see ¯gure 1).









Figure 1: Vertically Related Markets
Input B is a standard input which is produced in a competitive market,
i.e. there are many producers of it. While input A may be potentially
superior substitute of input B, it is only produced by a monopolist (the HQ).
We assume here that input A producer and input B producers already serve
other clients in the existing market, thus even if they do not sell the input to
the venture they can still operate in the market. The venture is potentially a
new big client. The existing market that the HQ serves and the new market
related to the HQ's line-of-business. He therefore will want to wait until this probability
is resolved before using own corporate ¯nancing.
8in which the venture operates are assumed to be segmented. This implies
that the HQ is able to price discriminate between the two markets. Later in
Section 7 we relax this.
Input A is potentially superior in the sense that if this input is used in
the production of the ¯nal good by the venture and provided that the ven-
ture exerts a su±cient additional R&D e®ort4 above the R&D e®ort that is
already exerted (recall that it was normalized to zero) to ensure complemen-
tarity, then there are complementary bene¯ts accrued to the venture in the
form of reduction in own marginal costs (in what follows it will be denoted
by ° ¸ 0). If R&D e®ort is not exerted, then using input A will imply
higher marginal costs of producing the ¯nal good for the venture than us-
ing the standard input (input B). This is motivated by the idea that input
A is a newly innovative input that is not yet widely used in the industry,
and thus to get the bene¯ts of using it, some adjustements (which requires
e®ort by the entrepreneur) has to be exerted in order to guarantee su±cient
complementarity.
For simplicity, we assume that one unit of input is needed to produce one
unit of the ¯nal good. We denote ®A as the proportion of shares obtained
by the IVC from the venture if input A is used, and I as the amount of
funds extended to the venture. In what follows we limit the presentation
to linear demand case. The inverse demand for the venture's product is
denoted by pA = (a ¡ QA): The probability of innovating is denoted by x;
with probabiltiy (1¡ x) it is a failure (and nothing is produced, not even
4We will endogenously derive later how su±cient is R&D e®ort should be in order to
take the bene¯ts of using input A.
9at ° = 0). The per unit price of input A is wA and the marginal costs of
producing the ¯nal good if input A is used and e®ort is exerted are (dA¡ °),
where throughout the paper dA > ° ¸ 0. The costs of exerting e®ort can be
expressed as
1
2k°2. Thus, exerting e®ort ° ,which costs
1
2k°2, will enable the
venture to reduce the marginal costs of producing the ¯nal good by °.
This leads to the following expected payo®s of the venture (if the venture
uses input A and exerts e®ort), and of the IVC,
¦A






ivc = ®Ax[pA¡ (wA+ (dA ¡ °))]QA ¡ I (2)
The payo®s of the venture, if the venture uses input A and no e®ort is




v = (1¡ ®B)x[pB ¡(dB + wB)]QB (3)
The per unit price of input B is wB. The marginal costs of producing the
¯nal good using input B is di®erent from using input A and equals to dB. In
order to focus our attention on the more interesting part of the analysis, we
assume here that dA > dB. Again, the ¯nal price for the venture's product
equals to pB = (a ¡ QB): Here the costs for ° does not enter the pro¯t
function since the venture of course will set ° = 0 if it intends to use input
B in the production phase.
10The timing of the game is as follows (see also ¯gure 2). There are es-
sentially ¯ve stages here. In stage 0, a contract between the IVC and the
entrepreneur is signed. The funds are disbursed. In stage 1, the optimal
e®ort (°) is determined (and exerted by the entrepreneur). In stage 2, the
venture passes the R&D phase andthe IVC exits. In stage 3, the input prices
are determined. Finally, in the last stage the optimal monopoly quantity is
set. We solve the game using backward induction.
Figure 2: The Timing Structure
The product market outcome is not determined by the success probability






(a ¡ wA¡ (dA¡ °)) (4)
11Then we will derive the optimal wA and wB: Note that here we need to
compare the net pro¯ts of using input A and using input B. Using input A




v = [pA ¡ (wA +(dA ¡ °))]QA (5)
Recall that pA = (a¡ QA) and pB = (a ¡ QB). Using input B, the pro¯ts
are (denoted by ©B
v ),
©B
v = [pB ¡ (wB + dB)]QB (6)






(a ¡ dB ¡ wB) (7)
Theinputproducers B willjust pricetheir product(the standardproduct)
as high as its marginal cost (cB) because there are many producers that
produce input B, thus,
wB = cB (8)
Hence, comparing both pro¯ts,
((a ¡Q
¤
A) ¡ (wA+ dA ¡ °))Q
¤
A = ((a ¡ Q
¤





B and wB = cB we have the following condition.
(a ¡cB ¡ dB) = (a ¡ wA ¡ dA +°)
12wA = (cB +dB ¡ (dA ¡°)) (9)
This says that pro¯ts accrued from using input A are the same as pro¯ts
accrued from using input B if the HQ is behaving opportunistically and
incorporates the bene¯ts of R&D in the price of input A.5 This is the best
strategy for the HQ. By setting the price slightly higher, the HQ loses all the
demand(which then goes to input B producers). Below that price, it is never
optimal provided that the monopoly price (see Tirole, 1988) is above that
equilibrium price; i.e. whenever 1
2 (a +cA) ¸ (cB +dB ¡ (dA¡ °)). Note
that dB¡(dA¡ °) is infact the di®erence in marginal costs of the venture of
using input A and input B.
Here we can already explain some potential cases. First, let us denote the
marginal costs of the HQ in producing input A by cA. Note that we always
have wA ¸ cA, hence we can substitute wA.
(cB +° ¡ (dA ¡dB)) ¸ cA
° ¡ (dA ¡ dB) ¸ (cA¡ cB) (10)
This says that the di®erence in the venture's additional marginal costs must
be greater or equal to the di®erence in the upstream ¯rms' marginal costs.
This is the feasibility condition for the price undercutting strategy of the HQ
(Bertrand price competition in order to attract demand). This condition
says that the price-undercutting strategy is feasible, and thus the venture
5This may be quite complicated for the readers at the moment, but it will become clear
when we solve the whole model. Under this strategy, the demand e®ect of using input A
or B cancels out. Since they are identical under the HQ's opportunistic behavior.
13will indeed use input A. Note that if the above condition is not satis¯ed,
then the price undercutting strategy is not feasible since the HQ make losses
(wA < cA). In this case the venture will utilize input B. Hence, we can state
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 (UndercuttingStrategy)The undercutting price wA = (cB + ° ¡ (dA¡ dB))
enables the HQ to get all demand from input producer B. With this un-
dercutting price strategy the HQ extracts all the complementary bene¯ts
(°) obtained by the entrepreneur (venture).
In what follows in this section and the next one, we assume
Assumption 1 (cB ¡ cA) ¸ (dA ¡ dB):
Expression (10) tells us that ° ¸ (dA ¡ dB) ¡(cB ¡ cA). Hence, assump-
tion1 implies that the RHS of (10) is negative, andthus it means that the HQ
can undercut input B producers' price pB even without extending corporate
venture ¯nancing.
We are now in the second stage. We derive the optimal °¤ by taking the
f.o.c. of the following expression w.r.t. ° and then solve for °.
¦A





¤ = 0 (12)
As °¤ = 0 then it makes the price-undercutting strategy become more
di±cult to be carried out. Note, that since °¤ = 0, there is also a hold-up
14problem. The venture will not have incentive to exert e®ort.6 Hence, we can
state the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Existence of a Hold-Up Problem) Without corporate venture ¯-
nancing, there is a hold-up problem (°¤ = 0). Thus, we have w¤
A =
(cB ¡(dA¡ dB)), which clearly shows that the HQ losses its °exibility
in implementing the price-undercutting strategy as wA > w¤
A.
Notice that if the HQ does not have an incentive to undercut more, then
corporate venture ¯nancing is very attractive as it will increase °¤ > 0; which
implies the HQ's pro¯ts increase because of the demand shift. Also corporate
venture ¯nancing is used to solve the hold-up problem. This will be discussed
in the next section.
In stage 1, we derive the optimal equity contracts. It is the pro¯t of the




ivc = ®Ax[(a ¡ QA) ¡ ((dA¡ °) + wA)]Q ¡ I = 0 (13)
¦
B











6If all the bargaining power at the production stage were given to the venture, there
would be no hold-up problem and thus CVC would not necessarily be needed since the
entrepreneur would then choose a positive value of ° (but not necessarily the value that





The equity contract should exactly compensate the IVC for the funds I








(a¡ cB ¡ dB)
2 (15)
Payo®s of the headquarter from selling input A to the venture are,
¦hq = xQ¤
A(w¤




(a ¡ cB ¡ dB)[(cB ¡ cA) ¡ (dA ¡ dB)] (17)






(a ¡ cB ¡ dB)
2 ¡ I (18)
¦ivc = 0 (19)
If the feasibility condition ° ¡ (dA¡ dB) ¸ (cA ¡ cB) is not satis¯ed,
the HQ has no incentive to use the undercutting strategy and therefore the
venture buys its input from input B producers.
3 The Model with Corporate Venture Financ-
ing
In this section we consider the case in which the HQ ¯nances the venture
through the corporate venture capital (CVC). This setting in which the HQ
16deals through an intermediary can bemotivatedby several reasons. Firstly, it
may be better to use an intermediary in order to gain trust from the venture
that the HQ will not steal the idea. Second, the HQ may need a middleman
who has the expertise to look a potential project, and this middleman is the
CVC. As the HQ may not have the expertise and lack of monitoring ability
then the use of an intermediary is preferable. Thirdly, it may also because
the HQ wants to focus and specialize on running the existing business, and
therefore prefers to subcontract the venture ¯nancing through a subsidiary
(the CVC) and for looking for new product ideas on the market.7
The di®erence between Corporate Venture ¯nancing and Independent
Venture lies on the fact that the CVC will impose the R&D e®ort that the
venture will have to spend and the venture has no °exibility anymore.8 We
assume here that the CVC also incurs some exogeneous ¯xed costs ¾ > 0 for
ensuring that once the venture exerts e®ort the complementary bene¯ts can
be accrued. In this sense, our model assumes that the amount of complemen-
tary bene¯ts can be observed with some costs, and a contract can be written
based on the level of R&D e®ort that the venture will have to exert. Thus,
inherently we assume that monitoring is fully e®ective and enables the CVC
to observe whether or not the entrepreneur has exerted the right e®ort. Ob-
7Notice that we still need to de¯ne the concept of \securing demand". Throughout
this paper, we will refer to it as the explicit use of CVC to generate demand in the sense
that without CVC no demand would go the the HQ. Under assumption 1, this does not
apply as undercutting always leads to demand. Therefore, the true analysis of the e®ect
of \securing demand" will be presented in Section 4 only.
8Alternatively, this model provides a rationale for syndication. The IVC might have
¯nanced the start-up phase of the venture (up to stage 0 of the game). At stage 0, the
CVC co-¯nances the venture (i.e. deal syndication) between the IVC and CVC. This is
discussed in more details in Section 6.
17viously, it is possible to relax this assumption and to consider a more explicit
contracting model. We leave this issue for further research and concentrating
our discussion on the product market aspect of corporate venture ¯nancing
rather than on the contracting aspect.
The timing structure is still more or less the same as before (see ¯gure
3). The only di®erence now is that the CVC instead of the IVC is the one
who plays a dominant role.
Figure 3: The Timing Structure with CVC
Recall, that this last stage is at the production phase. The pro¯ts of the















(a ¡ (dA¡ °) ¡ wA) (21)
The optimal wA and wB are still the same as in the benchmark case.











¡¾ ¡ I ¡ 1
2k°2 ¡ x






2 (a ¡ (dA ¡ °)¡ w¤
A), w¤
A = (cB +dB ¡ (dA ¡°)), and subject to
the entrepreneur's participation constraint, which is
¦A
v ¸ b ¦v ´
x
4
(a ¡ cB ¡ dB)
2 ¡ I (23)
In equilibrium, this inequality should be binding and ®A will be the solution
of this equality.
Notice that b ¦v represents the outside option (PC) ofthe venture, which is
the case without corporate venture ¯nancing and therefore from our bench-
mark case we know that °¤ = 0 (due to the hold-up problem), and ¾ repre-
sents the coordination or suplementary advice costs of the CVC.
Note that Q is independent of ° in this case because the monopoly price
of the HQ is greater than cB; therefore the HQ's pricing strategy results
from the undercutting equilibrium with respect to the outside option of the
19venture (which is the price of input B). If cB ¡ cA is moderate, then the
monopoly price of the HQ will always be higher than cB: Then, taking the
f.o.c. of the above pro¯t function w.r.t. °, we obtain the ¯rst-best (we put




(a ¡ cB ¡ dB) (24)
Given the undercuttingpricing strategyof the HQ, ° is independent of the
sharing rule between the venture and HQ for the venture's pro¯t. This stems
from the fact that the HQ will extract all the bene¯ts from complementarity
in innovation (° > 0) and make the bene¯ts only from the input supply to
the venture.
In stage 1, we solve for the equity shares provided that there is a contract
signed:
(1¡ ®A)x[(a ¡ Q¤




















The di®erence in shares exactly compensates the entrepreneur for the
e®ort he is exerting. This decreases as k gets larger since it negatively a®ects
°. Finally, we compare theHQ's pro¯ts with and without corporate ¯nancing
to determine under what condition is corporate venture ¯nancing pro¯table.
The result is summarized in the following proposition.
20Proposition 1 Financing through a CVC is optimal if ¾ < x2
8k (a ¡ cB ¡ dB)
2.
This leads to a positive °: The attractiveness of corporate venture ¯nancing
increases if;
(i) The market size (a) is larger.
(ii) The supplementary (coordination) costs of the corporate venture capital
(¾) are smaller.
(iii) The e±ciency of the entrepreneur's e®ort is higher (smaller k).
(iv) The marginal costs of the competitors (cB) are lower.
(v) The probability of success (x) increases.
Proof : See appendix.
The above proposition o®ers some testable implications. Intuitively, the
result says that the corporate group(HQ) faces the following trade-o®: either
be more aggressive ex post in the product market (by undercutting more its
rivals) or use corporate venture ¯nancing to a®ect the venture's product
innovation outcome to weaken competition with substitute products.9
4 The Case of Securing Demand
Inthis sectionwe relaxassumption1. Thus, weconsider the caseof(cB ¡ cA) <
(dA¡ dB), which implies that ° > 0. This means that price-undercutting
9Notice that it is always optimal for CVC to incur the monitoring costs ¾. If no ¾ by
the CVC, ° = 0 due to the hold-up problem. Furthermore, ° < °¤ only if ¾ excerted ex
post (which does not seem reasonible for VC monitoring).
21strategy without corporate venture ¯nancing becomes infeasible, i.e. the HQ
may obtain positive demand only if the HQ ¯nances the venture. As we have
analyzed previously, by providing a venture ¯nancing through the CVC, the
HQ can impose the optimal value of °:
There are two di®erent cases here, namely, (1) °¤ < (dA¡ dB)¡(cB¡cA),
and (2) °¤ ¸ (dA ¡ dB)¡ (cB¡ cA): In which °¤ indicates the optimal value
of ° (calculated as in the previous section).
In case 1, in order to enable price undercutting strategy, the HQ has to
impose °min = (dA¡ dB) ¡ (cB ¡ cA):10 This °min represents the least value
of ° that still enables the HQ to undercut its competitor. Its value is higher
than °¤. Imposing such a sub-optimal ° implies pro¯ts losses (denote pro¯ts
by e ¦
f
hq). It remains to check whether or not it may still be optimal to extend
venture ¯nancing. In the second case, the HQ will impose °¤. However, there
is a threshold value of °¤ that will make venture ¯nancing feasible. It is easy
to see that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2
(i) If case 1 prevails, corporate venture ¯nancing is not pro¯table. Fur-
thermore, because the HQ has no ability to undercut, it will not serve the new
market.
(ii) If case 2 prevails, the pro¯tability of corporate venture ¯nancing will
depend on the value of °¤ that is to be imposed. Corporate venture ¯nancing
will be extended i® °¤ ¸ °¤, in which °¤ is the threshold value of °; above
10See expression (10).
22which the HQ can still make su±cient pro¯ts to compensate for monitor-




costs. The venture ¯nancing will enable the HQ
to secure demand. Otherwise if °¤ < °¤, then the HQ will not supply the
venture.
Proof : See appendix.
5 Summary of the Results
From the analysis so far, we have shown that the HQ faces a trade-o® be-
tween, on the one hand, being more aggressive ex-post in the product market
by undercutting its rivals' price, and, on the other hand, using the CVC to
a®ect the venture's product innovation outcome in order to weaken compe-
tition with its rivals. In addition, we have also shown that under a certain
conditions (see Section 4), the HQ can undercut its rivals' price if and only
if the HQ uses the CVC to provide ¯nancing to the venture.
A crucial element that will determine the choice of strategy is the relative
magnitude of (cB¡cA) to (dA¡dB). Notice that (cB¡cA) represents the rel-
ative cost e±ciency of the HQ vis-a-vis its rivals. The more cost e±cient the
HQ is (the lower cA is), the lower the price of input A is. This represents the
bene¯ts of the venture from using the specialized input A. The term (dA¡dB)
represents relative cost disadvantage for the venture from using the special-
ized input A when ° = 0 (note that by assumption dA > dB). Obviously, in
order to provide incentive for the venture to use the specialized input A, the
HQ has to ensure that the bene¯ts for the venture exceed the costs. This in
turn depends on the magnitude of (cB ¡ cA) and complementarity °.
231. cA < cB (the HQ has a cost advantage vis-a-vis its rivals) and As-
sumption 1 is satis¯ed. In this case, the HQ does not need to provide
venture ¯nancing to the venture. Price undercutting alone is su±cient
to enable the HQ to get the demand. Proposition 1 determines when
CVC is used.
2. cA < cB (the HQ has a cost advantage vis-a-vis its rivals) but Assump-
tion 1 is not satis¯ed. In this case, it will be better for the HQ to
provide venture ¯nancing to the venture. By giving venture ¯nanc-
ing, the venture's product innovation outcome is altered in such a way
that the costs of the venture from using the specialized input A will be
lowered by the amount of complementary bene¯ts °: Thus, the costs
will be (dA ¡ dB ¡ °), which clearly shows that the °exibility of price
undercutting strategy is enhanced.
3. cA > cB (the HQ has a small cost dis-advantage vis-a-vis its rivals) and
°¤ ¸ °¤. In this case, giving a venture ¯nancing is a must. It enables
the HQ to secure demand, which would have been impossible to do,
had the HQ not extended venture ¯nancing.
4. cA >> cB (the HQ has a huge cost dis-advantage vis-a-vis its rivals)
and °¤ < °¤. In this case, the HQ will not be active in the new market,
in which the venture operates.
246 General Discussion
In this Section, we brie°y discuss how participation of corporate venture
capitalists happen in practice, and present a few additional examples to the
ones already mentioned in the Introduction.
In fact, a corporate venture capitalist11 can enter shareholdership in a
venture, either by re¯nancing it (i.e., by buying the shares of the former
IVC) or by syndicating next ¯nancing rounds. In the latter case, the IVC
remains as a shareholder in the venture but does not ¯nance the next round
in full anymore; the rest can be provided by new shareholders, like corporate
venture capitalists. For the CVC with strategic ¯t to the fund provider (the
HQ), it then represents a strategic investment for the HQ (a \spin-in", in
contrast to spin-o®s). Re¯nancing is quite rare in Europe but syndication
is much more important. For 2000, re¯nancing to another venture capitalist
occured in 11.6% of amount divested, and to ¯nancial institutions in only
3.9% (EVCA (2001)). Syndication appeared in 28% of amount divested (the
11Gompers and Lerner (1998) distinguish between two di®erent types of corporate ven-
ture capitalists: one with and one without strategic ¯t. We focus on the ¯rst one, in
which the corporate venture capitalist ¯nances start-up companies that eventually come
up with a product that is in line with the HQ's businesses. Notice although that this does
not mean that the CVC is a \servant" of the HQ. The CVC simply is a venture capitalist
whose funds are solely provided by a single source (the HQ) but his objective still is to
make money for himself. The particularity of a CVC with strategic ¯t is that the HQ
imposes constraints on the CVC on the types of ventures to ¯nance. Furthermore, this
remaining independence from the HQ is required; if the HQ were able to change the status
of his agreement with the CVC (or to collude with the CVC to hold-up the ventures),
then no entrepreneur would be willing to approach such a CVC. The fact that syndication
also involves ICVs with the only aim to maximize expected pro¯ts further weakens the
opportunistic behavior of HQs (the only problem that may occur is when ° also implies a
negative externality in the venture's use of alternative inputs, like for input B producers;
this would create a dependence of the venture on the HQ and thus the entrepreneur would
need to be compensated with additional shares).
255-year average is 30%, which shows that 2000 was not an exceptional year).
In case of syndication, the involvement of the CVC can also be viewed in
some way as being a joint venture between the entrepreneur and the HQ.
It is di±cult to assess the relative importance of eachexit route for CVCs,
but a trade sale to the HQ is certainly not the only way. Evidence is pro-
vided by looking more closely to some corporate venture capitalists. For
instance, Siemens Venture Capital invests in numerous start-ups and not all
of them are afterwards integrated into Siemens. For instance, Digital Envoy,
that developedinternet-routing technologies, still has Siemens as partner and
customer but is now a privately held company,like many others. Other com-
panies that were ¯nanced with Siemens venture capital, went public. Similar
examples can be found for other CVCs, like Intel Capital and Cisco.
Also, incentivization is easier in small ¯rms than when the venture is
integrated into the HQ. Incentivization typically occurs with stock options
that are given to key employees. These are most e®ective if the shares are
the most sensitive to the management's actions. In addition, such ventures
often continue to innovate further after the investors have exited; typically,
this still requires a lose hierarchical structure. In this case, a merger may
imply huge costs.
7 Extensions
7.1 The Impact of the HQ's Existing Market
Until now, we have assumed either that the HQ was only providing input A
to the new venture (creation of a new market for the HQ) or that the new
26demand generated by the venture's innovation was totally separate from the
other demand for input A (market segmentation). In both cases, the HQ was
able to set the price wA for the venture monopolistically and independently
from any other demand for this same input. In this section, we show that
taking into account for the fact that other ¯rms also buy input A (but for
another use) may a®ect the decision of the HQ to undercut or not (and thus
to use corporate venture ¯nancing or not). Though, the major results on
the use of corporate venture ¯nancing remain qualitatively unchanged after
slight modi¯cations.
A simple way to illustrate this is to de¯ne the total demand of all other
buyers by q andto assume it to be perfectly inelasticto price upto some price
w (this is to say that we only consider the price e®ect but not the volume
e®ect in the analysis). Thus, for pure sake of simplicity, let us assume q ¯x
and independent of the wholesale price wA.
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The term in the last line is new; it represents the expected pro¯ts ofthe HQ's
existing market. By assumption, [(1¡ x)w + xw¤
A ¡ cA] > 0; otherwise, the
HQ would exit from the existing market (which is a case that we do not
focus on). Furthermore, to concentrate on the most interesting case of the
analysis, we assume that w > w¤
A (recall that the demand function for the
existing market is discontinuous at w and that w¤
A = (cB + dB ¡ dA+ °)).
The ¯rst-order condition yields °¤¤ = x
2k (a¡ cB ¡ dB +2q). The optimal
27° increases with q, the size of the existing market's demand. Demand Q¤
A
is still equal to 1
2(a¡ cB ¡ dB) (as previously due to the price undercutting
















(a ¡ cB ¡ dB + 2q)
2
Thus, corporate venture ¯nancing is pro¯table whenever the diference be-
tween the gain from employing it (x°(Q¤
A +q)) and its costs (1
2k(°¤¤)
2)
overweights monitoring costs (¾). This di®erence equals
x2
8k (a ¡ c¡ d + 2q)
2,
which increases with q, the size of the existing market. Notice that we still
need to check whether it is pro¯table for the HQ to serve this new market by
lowering the wholesale price wA; i.e., his outside option is (w ¡ cA)q. This
was assumed to be the case by assumption. Thus, this positive relation-
ship between q and the likelihood for corporate venture ¯nancing stems from
the fact that the new market is served anyway so that the use of corporate
venture ¯nancing allows to weaken the ex-post competition on the product
market (and therefore to increase the price-cost margin).
If the outside option is not to serve the market in case corporate venture
¯nancing is not used, the picture looks di®erent. This means that ¦
f
hq >
(w ¡ cA)q > ¦
nf
hq. We need to check the ¯rst inequality12 ¦
f





hq + x°¤¤ (Q¤
A + q) ¡ 1
2k (°¤¤)
2 ¡ ¾. The second inequal-
ity ((w ¡ cA) q > ¦
nf







q (Recall that the assumptions in this Section imply that w >
dB ¡ dA + cB so that the left-hand side is strictly positive).
28This is the case i®
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When di®erentiating on both sides with respect to q, we get that corporate
venture ¯nancing is increasingly pro¯table as q increases (since then the
di®erence between ¦
f
hq and (w ¡ cA)q is getting larger) i®
x°
¤¤(q;:::) > w ¡ cA
sothat theuse of corporate venture ¯nancingis morelikely for highq. This is
always the case. If this were not the case, using corporate venture ¯nancing
to insure additional demand from the venture is not pro¯table; i.e. ¦
f
hq <
(w ¡ cA)q. Its likelihood decreases with the level of w.
We can therefore state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The optimal degree of complementarity °¤¤ is an increasing
function of the size of the HQ's existing market q. Also, the greater q, the
more likely the use of corporate venture ¯nancing by the headquarter.
The intuitions are straigthforward. In the ¯rst case, the HQ has the
incentive to impose a higher ° if q is more important since it weakens ex post
competition and therefore allows the HQ to keep the price wA still rather
high. The greater q, the more important this e®ect on own pro¯t ¦hq. The
secondimplicationgoes along the sameline, sinceagainthe needto weakenex
post competition (in order to avoid decreasing price wA too much) increases
with q, making the use of corporate venture ¯nancing more valuable.
297.2 The Case of Vertical Merger
In this sub-section, we analyse the case of vertical merger, in which the HQ
acquires the venture, rather than letting the venture to become an indepen-
dent ¯nal good producer. We assume that the merger takes place after the
CVC exits. There will just be an internal transfer of shares from the CVC
to the HQ.13.
It should be noted here that, by merging, the HQ will automatically be
able to enforce the use of input A by the venture without having to undercut
its competitor. The price charged for input A will be equal to marginal costs
of producing input A. Thus, theHQ subsidizes the venture inorder toextract
higher monopoly pro¯ts of the venture.
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2 (a¡ (dA¡ °m)¡ wm
A)andwm
A = cA. Inwhichsuperscript
'm' indicates the merger case. Note that wm
A is an internal transfer price, and
is set as high as the marginal costs of producing input A. The HQ still needs
to give the venture its outside option in order to guarantee that the venture
will accept the venture ¯nancing contract. The solution for the optimal ° in





(a ¡ dA¡ cA)
It can then be shown that the following proposition holds.
13We assume away incentive problems faced by the HQ in this transfer of shares.
30Proposition 4 Given that the HQ extends corporate venture ¯nancing to
the venture, then HQ's can enjoy even larger pro¯ts by merging with the
venture.
Proof : See appendix.
We should bear in mind that it is assumed here that a merger entails
no costs. Once we introduce costs of merger, the result might change. A
merger may not be feasible anymore depending on the magnitude of merger
costs. Nevertheless, the analysis points to an interesting implication namely
that, whenever a vertical merger is possible at no costs the exit route that
the CVC (the HQ) would choose is acquisition. But as already discussed in
Section 6, mergers are not the unique exit route for CVCs.
Notice although that the trade-o® presented in Section 3 still holds (with
slight modi¯cation) even if a merger is allowed. Under merger, the quantities






























respectively) denotes the quantity produced in equilibrium (marginal cost of
the HQ and expected pro¯ts of the HQ, respectively) under a merger when
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i.e., the di®erence in expected pro¯ts must compensate the additional costs
from using corporate venture capital (the monitoring costs ¾ and the en-
trepreneur's compensation for his additional e®ort). This means that the
trade-o® does not vanish if merging is allowed.
7.3 The Case of Indirect Securing of Demand
Until now, the demand generated for the HQ by the venture's innovative
product has always been \direct"; i.e. the HQ's product has directly been
used as input by the venture. We now consider an indirect demand e®ect
where the HQ's product is not used as input by the venture but rather
bought by consumers as complementary product to the venture's one. Let
us illustrate this with a simple example. Suppose the venture successfully
invented a new webcam. Then, it is fully conceivable that buyers of this new
webcam potentially also buy better processor since the new webcam will
require a su±ciently well performing computer. Thus, the HQ (the producer
of processors) may realize an increase in demand after the introduction of
the new webcam. In what follows, we will label such a demand e®ect as
\indirect". This type of demand creation is considered here.
The HQ or his competitors get additional demand µQi, with i 2 fA;Bg.
The HQ therefore againhas an interest in the successful R&D outcome of the
32Figure 4: Indirect Securing of Demand
entrepreneur. We assume that funding the venture does not a®ect anymore
the value of the venture but makes the use of the HQ's product more attrac-
tive (i.e., cheaper to use) for consumers. When deciding between product A
or product B, consumers buy the cheapest one (so that all demand goes to
either the HQ or its competitors).
The venture faces demand as before; input price is ¯xed w (e.g., either
because this input is supplied by many ¯rms so that they face perfect com-
petition or that the demand of the venture is too small to a®ect the price)
and provided by another ¯rm than the HQ. Thus, the value of the venture in
case of successful innovation is 1
4 (a ¡ w ¡ d)
2, where d is the marginal cost
for transforming each unit of input into a unit of output (before we distin-
guished between cA and cB; now they represent the marginal production cost
for the HQ and its substitutes. While cB is given, cA can be reduced by the
33amount ± if the entrepreneur excerts e®ort 1
2k±2 during the R&D stage. ±
therefore represents e®ort done by the entrepreneur to increase compatibility
(or degree of complementarity) between the venture's and theHQ's products.
Thus, ± > 0 again allows the HQ to increase price-cost margin in product
market stage.
Notice that the entrepreneur's outside option is worth
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xµ(pA ¡ cA)QA if undercutting is pro¯table (cA ￿ cB)
0 if no undercutting (no demand, cA > cB)
We only solve for the case of no merger; i.e., the entrepreneur chooses the
price of his product non-cooperatively from the HQ. The amount of shares
(1¡ ®0) must compensate the entrepreneur for his outside option and for his
e®ort excerted 1
2k±2 (again, for simplicity, we assume ± to be contractible {
or alternatively, that monitoring is fully e®ective if the CVC excerts e®ort
¾).
Corporate venture ¯nancing will therefore be used by the HQ whenever
the costs of monitoring ¾ and for compensating the entrepreneur for his
additional e®ort is less than the gain (i.e. the possibility either to undercut
and thus to secure demand or simply to weaken competition (this is the case
when demand can be secured through undercutting even without the use
of corporate venture ¯nancing, like in Section 3)). We can then derive the
following proposition.
34Proposition 5 When the demand e®ect is \indirect", it may still be prof-
itable for a headquarter to use corporate venture ¯nancing for securing own




optimal level of complementarity ±¤ is increasing in the demand generated by
the innovative venture (µQA).
Proof : See appendix.
Notice although that the hold-up e®ect (Lemma 1) through price un-
dercutting in the product market stage vanishes (but only in this simpli¯ed
version where the price of the HQ's product does not a®ect the venture's
demand).
8 Conclusion
There are several reasons why a ¯rm may establish a corporate venture ¯-
nancing subsidiary (see Gompers and Lerner (1998)). One of these reasons,
which is quite often cited in the popular business news is the desire of big
corporations to get an opportunity to sell their own product, and thus se-
curing demand for the ¯rm. In this paper, we provide a formalization of this
kind of reasoning.
The decision to use corporate venture ¯nancing allows the ¯rm to in°u-
ence the degree of complementarity between its product (used by the venture
as an input) and the ¯nal product of the venture. This allows the HQ to
\steal" demand from other companies when the HQ's product can be substi-
tuted by other products. We show that in the absence of corporate venture
35¯nancing there can be a hold-up problem. We also show that the (either
direct or indirect) securing demand e®ect is made possible because corporate
venture ¯nancing enhances the °exibility of a price undercutting strategy
in the product market. The ¯rm will not have to undercut its competitor
too much. At the extreme case, in which the ¯rm is not able to do price-
undercutting strategy, the corporate venture ¯nancing will enable the ¯rm
to \steal" demand from its competitors. In this paper, we also derive some
testable empirical implications as well.
Last but not least, our framework can be embedded into the literature
on network economics, in particular on the issue of competing platforms.
It is frequently mentioned in this literature, that an operating system pro-
ducer often encourages software developers to create new applications using
the operating system as a platform, and thus enhancing the value of the
operating system in the market. By doing this, the producer can create a
stronger base for its operating system in the market.14 In many cases, the
operating system producer can accomplish this goal by providing software
building blocks that lower the costs of developing complementary software
applications. Cusumano and Yo±e (1998), for instance, mention that as of
1995 Microsoft spent about 65 million dollars annually supporting indepen-
dent software developers and had about 400 technical support engineers who
exclusively served independent developers. In our framework, this assistance
in term of the provision of software buiding blocks, is substituted with a
¯nancial assistance that will enable the independent developers to innovate
14See Davis, MacCrisken and Murphy (2001) for a survey article on software design, PC
operating systems and platforms.
36in such a way that lowers the costs of developing complementary software
applications. Integrating these two aspects in one framework and deriving
conditions under which a particular approach is more optimal would be an
interesting area for future research.
APPENDIX
Proof to Proposition 1
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which is the case whenever
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Because of the price undercutting strategy, the monitoring cost ¾ and
the e®ort costs is paid from the upstream pro¯ts (supply of input to the
venture). The venture pro¯t just compensates for the investment costs I and
the outside option of the entrepreneur.
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Proof to Proposition 2
The HQ's pro¯ts without venture ¯nancing are zero (since price under-
cutting strategy is not feasible). Venture ¯nancing is feasible if and only if
e ¦
f
hq ¸ e ¦
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We know that, w¤
A = (cB + dB ¡ dA +°min) and °min = (dA¡ dB)¡(cB¡cA),
hence imposing °min implies that the HQ will charge w¤
A = cA. Simplifying
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2 ¡ ¾ < 0
which is clearly negative. This means that imposing °min results in negative
pro¯ts. It enables the HQ to undercut its competitor, however the pro¯ts
accrued are not su±cient to compensate for the monitoring and e®ort costs.
By de¯nition, imposing °¤ < °min, will not enable the HQ to do price un-
dercutting. Thus, it should be that °¤ > °min. It is then obvious to see
that whenever case 1 prevails, corporate venture ¯nancing is not pro¯table.
Furthermore, because the HQ has no ability to undercut, it will not serve
the new market.
In case 2, the pro¯tability of corporate venture ¯nancing will depend
on the value of °¤ that is to be imposed. It should at least compensate







de¯ne °¤ as the value of °; such that e ¦
f
hq = 0. It is straightforward to see
that venture ¯nancing is feasible if °¤ > °¤. It enables the HQ to secure
demand, which would have been impossible to do, had the HQ not extended
venture ¯nancing.¥
38Proof to Proposition 4
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Plugging the expressions for s and t.
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We can establish that (dA ¡ dB) ¡ (cB ¡ cA) < 0 (using assumption 1) and
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40which implies that , s > ¡
(x¡2k)t






Proof to Proposition 5
Without corporate venture ¯nancing, ± = 0 since the entrepreneur has
no incentive to excert any additional e®ort. ± does not enter into his max-
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where the left-hand side represents the di®erence between gainfrom ±¤ (when
corporate venture ¯nancing is used) and e®ort cost (additional compensation
for the entrepreneur).¥
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